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Abstract:
A principal purpose of Dodd-Frank is to end "too-big-to-fail." It makes improvements, but leaves in place
two market failures that continue too-big-to-fail. Large banks receive an implicit subsidy, because of
the continuing perception that they are too-big-to-fail. They also face incentives to make riskier
investment choices because while they fully capture the returns for successful investments, the losses
from catastrophic failures will be shared by taxpayers. Moreover, the costs of complying with DoddFrank's regulations may make smaller banks "too-small-to-succeed." Consequently, we need to go
beyond the command-and-control approach of the Dodd-Frank Act, and adopt economic instruments to
correct these market failures.
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In 2010, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act1 (DoddFrank). According to its preamble, Dodd-Frank was supposed “to end ‘too big to fail.’”2 “Too big to fail”
(TBTF) had played a devastating role in the 2008 Financial Crisis in the United States.3 In order to
address the problem of TBTF, Dodd-Frank employs a number of approaches.4 However, the challenges
presented by TBTF are more like a sea-monster from a late-night horror movie (let’s call it “Octozilla”):
when the sailors try to attack Octozilla head-on, the creature’s other tentacles reach around and knock
the sailors out of the way. Similarly, because Dodd-Frank’s approaches do not directly address market
incentives, the problem of the “Octozilla” of TBTF remains.
Meanwhile, certain provisions of Dodd-Frank actually exacerbate the problem of TBTF. One of the
by-products of Dodd-Frank’s Volcker Rule5 is that certain smaller banks may become “too-small-tosucceed” (TSSS). This article suggests that the use of a portfolio of market instruments will be necessary
to address TBTF without making other banks TSSS.
TBTF reared its head initially in the 1980s, and in the years prior to the 2008 financial crisis, the
challenges presented by TBTF multiplied. Economies of scale took hold in the financial industry, and at
the same time, the 1994 Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act6 repealed the
prohibition against interstate banking.7 As a result, certain banks and other financial entities became
interconnected with a large number of other financial groups. As a result, failure and bankruptcy of one
such entity could cause massive disruptions throughout the US economy. Consequently, a perception
arose that when one such large bank might appear to be heading for bankruptcy, it was expected that
the federal government would step in to prevent the failure and the resulting damage to the entire
economy. These perceptions created perverse incentives for large banks and other financial entities to
take on excessive leverage and risks that exacerbated the 2008 crisis.
Dodd-Frank addresses TBTF via a number of instruments. One is the creation of the Financial
Services Oversight Council (FSOC). One of the FSOC’s most important tasks is to determine which nonbanks should be designated as “systemically important financial institutions” (SIFIs). These designated

1

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 12 U.S.C. §§
5301-5641 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank].
2
Dodd-Frank, pmbl.
3
For reviews of the causes of the 2008 financial crisis, see for example, VIRAL A. ACHARYA ET AL., REGULATING
WALL STREET: THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE (2010); FINANCIAL
CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES (2011), available
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf; and ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE
INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM - AND
THEMSELVES (2009).
4
See ____
5
Dodd-Frank §619, codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851.
6
H.R. 3841--103rd Congress: Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994. (1994). Retrieved
December 26, 2013, from http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/103/hr3841.
7
Interstate banking had been mostly prohibited under the Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act
of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d).
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SIFIs along with bank holding companies having more than $50 billion in assets8 are subjected to more
intrusive capital and behavioral regulations to prevent excessive risks. Dodd-Frank also establishes an
“Orderly Liquidation Authority” (OLA) to more carefully deal with closing down a SIFI without provoking
a run. And Dodd-Frank specifically forbids emergency lending by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) or Federal Reserve to SIFIs (until they are under the OLA), in order to suggest that the
too-big-to-fail policy is over.
Another part of Dodd-Frank is the Volcker Rule, which prohibits certain types of proprietary trading
activities by commercial banks. The Volcker Rule is supposed to reduce the need for a TBTF policy by
making it less likely that a large commercial bank would need external support as a result of large
trading losses, such as those incurred by J.P. Morgan Chase in the “London Whale”9 debacle that
occurred in 2012. Preventing the possibility of these enormous losses should reduce the probability that
these large commercial banks would need to be bailed out.
Despite all of these regulations, TBTF remains a problem. There is evidence that the market
continues to give SIFIs benefits because of an expectation that they are indeed TBTF. Consequently,
many scholars have suggested that Dodd-Frank does not go far enough to end too-big-to-fail.10 These
scholars suggest a variety of approaches to better address TBTF. A number have suggested that a direct
structural solution is needed: a breakup of the largest banks. Others have suggested changes in
corporate governance or in corporate finance. Still others have suggested that because too-big-to-fail
entities receive implicit subsidies, the best remedy is through a tax that counteracts these subsidies.
This article argues that Dodd-Frank had it wrong: there is no way to completely end TBTF.
Economies of scale and the increasingly interconnected network of finance mean that TBTF is here to
stay. Instead, what we need to do is counteract each of the effects of TBTF with an appropriate
instrument. This article notes that there are multiple market inefficiencies that result from TBTF. Some
of these are market distortions that lead to inefficient incentives. Others relate to liquidity traps that
can lead to pressure to bail out a failing bank. This article argues that the best approach is to use a
portfolio of market instruments, including a combination of two separate taxes, to address the multiple
inefficiencies of TBTF.
The rest of this article is as follows. Section I provides a brief history of TBTF in the United States,
while Section II uses this history to highlight the fundamental factors that underlie and result from a
TBTF policy. Section III describes how Dodd-Frank addresses TBTF, and Section IV summarizes the

8

Dodd-Frank, 12 U.S.C. § 5326(a).
See JP Morgan Chase Whale Trades: A Case History of Derivatives Risks and Abuses: Hearing before the
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
United States Senate, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, First Session, March 15, 2013, available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg85162/html/CHRG-113shrg85162.htm.
10
See § III, infra, for a more complete examination of these critiques. See also Dale B. Thompson, The Dodd-Frank
Act and Too-Big-to-Fail: What’s Missing? A Survey of the Current Literature, 6 UNIV. ST. THOMAS J. L. PUB. POL.
(forthcoming 2014) [hereinafter, Dodd-Frank & TBTF: What’s Missing?].
9
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academic literature’s critique of Dodd-Frank’s approach to TBTF. Finally, Section V offers the argument
for using two different taxes to address the two distortions resulting from too-big-to-fail.

I.

A Short History of Too-Big-to-Fail in the United States Financial Industry

The history of TBTF goes back to an action by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in
the 1980s. In May of 1984, an “electronic bank run” on Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust
Company took place.11 At the time, Continental Illinois was the seventh-largest U.S. bank, and had
connections to a large number of other correspondent banks.12 As a result, “bank regulators were faced
with a potential crisis that might envelop the entire banking system.”13 With this situation, it was
thought that the “run had to be stopped,”14 and so the FDIC took extraordinary steps to end the crisis.15
As a result of these actions, people started to realize that the systemic risk consequences of the
liquidation of certain banks would lead “bank regulators [to] look for alternatives to closing the bank
and paying off the insured depositors.”16 This meant that we had a de facto policy of too-big-to-fail.
TBTF played a major role in the 2008 Financial Crisis, and our experiences demonstrate the multiple
problems associated with TBTF. Although the Federal Reserve had helped broker the sale of Bear
Stearns to JP Morgan Chase in early 2008,17 no such support was offered to Lehman Brothers. Similar to
Continental Illinois, Lehman Brothers underwent a liquidity crisis when JP Morgan Chase and Citigroup
demanded additional collateral.18 The bankruptcy examiner concluded that this liquidity crisis was
behind the end of Lehman Brothers: “Lehman’s available liquidity is central to the question of why
Lehman failed.”19 Lehman’s failure caused a panic in the financial markets, and faced with financial
calamity, the federal government intervened significantly to support other SIFIs, including Citigroup,
Wells Fargo, JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, and others.20 Much of
this support came through the Troubled Asset Relief Program, established by the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008.21

11
FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., HISTORY OF THE 80S: VOL. I, AN EXAMINATION OF THE BANKING CRISES OF THE 1980S
AND EARLY 1990s (1997), ch. 7: Continental Illinois and "Too Big to Fail," at 243, available at
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/235_258.pdf.
12
Id. at 250 (stating that “Continental had an extensive network of correspondent banks, almost 2,300 of which
had funds invested in Continental”).
13
Id. at 244.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 244-45.
16
Id. at 249.
17
Dodd-Frank & TBTF: What’s Missing?
18
See Anton R. Valukas, Report Of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner, In Re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (2010),
available at http://jenner.com/lehman/, at 24.
19
Id.
20
Robert J. Rhee, Case Study of the Bank of America and Merrill Lynch Merger (2010), available at
http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1939&context=fac_pubs, at at 4.
21
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110–343, div. A, Oct. 3, 2008, 122 Stat. 3765, 12 U.S.C. §§
5211–5241 (2010).
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These large financial institutions – both banks and non-banks – were behind the dramatic expansion
of credit during the first part of the 2000s.22 These institutions originated a number of risky loans, and
also then securitized bundles of these loans through complex financial instruments.23 When the crisis
struck, these large institutions were affected most significantly. As Arthur Wilmarth has noted, the “‘big
eighteen’ [large, complex, financial institutions]24 accounted for three-fifths of the $1.5 trillion of total
worldwide losses recorded by banks, securities firms, and insurers between the outbreak of the financial
crisis in mid-2007 and the spring of 2010.”25
Faced with the possible ramifications of these losses, the United States and a number of European
governments “provided extensive assistance to ensure the survival”26 of the “big eighteen.” This
assistance included both “$290 billion of capital infusions from the federal government, and ... $235
billion of debt that was guaranteed (and thereby subsidized) by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation.”27 Thomas Hoenig, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, noted, “It is
no longer conjecture that the largest institutions in the United States have been determined to be too
big to fail. They have been bailed out.”28
These experiences demonstrate the interconnections between the existence of a TBTF policy, the
effects on financial market actors due to this policy, and the key factors that precipitate the need to bailout a SIFI. As seen in both the Continental Illinois and Lehman Brothers experiences, liquidity problems
are frequently the precipitating factor behind the collapse of a SIFI. Beyond liquidity, the fundamental
reasons for the 2008 crisis were improper incentives – directly caused by the TBTF policy - that led SIFIs
to take too many, excessively risky investments. During the 2008 Crisis, easier access to increasing
amounts of external financing led these SIFIs to develop overly complex and risky financial instruments.
And when these risks revealed themselves, the perceived toxicity of these assets destroyed their
marketability, thereby depriving them of the liquidity the SIFIs needed to continue. And that is when
the federal government, faced with the possibility of the devastating impact on the economy, was
forced to step in and bail out these TBTF SIFIs.29

22
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem,
89 OR. L. REV. 951, 963 (2011).
23
Id. at 963-7.
24
The “big eighteen” include the largest U.S. and foreign banks, along with non-banks such as the largest U.S.
securities firms and AIG. See Hearing on "Examining Enhanced Supervision for Regulating Large, Complex Financial
Institutions,” before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Protection of the Committee on
Banking, Housing, And Urban Affairs, United States Senate, 112th Cong. (DECEMBER 7, 2011) (Prepared Statement
of Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.) at 61, n. 25, available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg74834.
25
Wilmarth, supra note 22, at 978.
26
Id. at 979.
27
Id.
28
Thomas M. Hoenig, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Leverage and Debt: The Impact of Today’s
Choices on Tomorrow, Speech at the 2009 Annual Meeting of the Kansas Bankers Ass’n (Aug. 6, 2009), at 4,
available at http://www.kansascityfed.org/SpeechBio/HoenigPDF/hoenigKBA.08.06.09.pdf, cited by Wilmarth,
supra note 22, at 979-80, n. 111.
29
Recall that this bailout was accomplished via TARP.
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II.

Dodd-Frank’s Mechanisms to Address Too-Big-to-Fail

Recognizing these problems, Congress enacted Dodd-Frank in 2010 to prevent future financial
crises. Its preamble specifically states that one of its purposes was ““to end ‘too big to fail.’”30
Additionally, when President Obama signed the legislation, he explained, “‘Because of this law, the
American people will never again be asked to foot the bill for Wall Street's mistakes. ... And there will be
new rules to make clear that no firm is somehow protected because it is “too big to fail.”’”31
There are four principal parts of Dodd-Frank designed to end TBTF: the creation of the Financial
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC);32 the creation of the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA); a
prohibition against the Federal Reserve or the FDIC lending to “financially failing firm[s];” 33 and the
Volcker Rule. The purpose of the FSOC is to better regulate those financial institutions that pose
systemic risks. Large banks are regulated currently by the Federal Reserve and the FDIC, but Dodd-Frank
allows the FSOC to impose additional regulations on systemically important banks. In particular, the
FSOC can “impose[]… heightened leverage and risk-based capital standards”34 on these banks. More
significantly, the FSOC can determine whether a non-bank is systemically important, and if so, then it
can designate the non-bank as a SIFI.35 These non-bank SIFIs are currently regulated much less than
large banks, and so this designation by the FSOC would impose significant new controls on them, as they
would also have to comply with similar “leverage and risk-based capital standards”36 as large-bank SIFIs.
The purpose of the Orderly Liquidation Authority is to provide “a credible tool to wind down
large, highly leveraged, and substantially interconnected financial firms.”37 In the 2008 Financial Crisis,
we saw effects on failing financial institutions similar to bank runs.38 A “liquidity trap” emerges where
failing firms need to raise capital quickly, while at the same time, their creditors are attempting to

30

Dodd-Frank, pmbl.
Stacy Kaper, Obama Signs Historic Regulatory Reform Bill into Law, AM. BANKER
(July 21, 2010), available at http://www.americanbanker.com/news/obama-1022698-1.html (quoting
statement made by President Obama upon signing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act).
32
The FSOC is composed of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Chairs of the
Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Securities and Exchange the Commodities
Futures Trading Commission, and other members.
33
Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1349, 1406 n. 229 (2011). See also Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadows: Financial Regulation
and Responsibility Failure, 19 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1781, 1818-19 (2013).
34
Rob Tammero, Note, Reigning in Systemically Important Financial Institutions, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 595,
599 (2011), available at http://www.bu.edu/rbfl/files/2013/09/ReigningInFinancialInstitutions.pdf.
35
Douglas J. Elliott, Regulating Systemically Important Financial Institutions That Are Not Banks (2013), at 1,
available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/05/09-regulating-financialinstitutions-elliott/09-regulating-financial-institutions-elliott.pdf.
36
Tammero, supra note 34, at 599.
37
Michael S. Barr, The Financial Crisis and the Path of Reform, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 91, 100 (2012).
38
See Dale B. Thompson, Why we Need a Superfund for Hedge Funds, 79 MISS. L. J. 995 (2010) [hereinafter
Superfund for Hedge Funds].
31
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extract capital from them. To combat this, Dodd-Frank creates the OLA, which is “modeled on the FDIC
process that successfully took deposit-taking banks [during the 2008 Crisis] … into receivership and
restructured them without significant disruption to the broader financial system.”39
These two new regulatory bodies along with the prohibition on lending to failing SIFIs are key
steps towards ending TBTF. In addition to the heightened requirements for bank SIFIs, bringing nonbank SIFIs under the regulatory umbrella should reduce the likelihood that any SIFI would fail. Also, as
this author has noted before, “creating a better liquidation process would mean that failure of any one
SIFI could be handled without having the failure spread to other parts of the financial system.”40
Meanwhile, the prohibition on emergency lending should reduce the perception that government would
bail out a failing SIFI.
Another part of Dodd-Frank was the Volcker Rule. During the Great Depression, Congress
enacted the Glass-Steagall Act41 imposed barriers between commercial and investment banks, generally
prohibiting commercial banks from engaging in the selling of most securities.42 However, in 1999, the
Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act43 repealed part of the Glass-Steagall Act, thereby allowing commercial banks to
conduct securities operations. The Volcker Rule is designed to reinstitute some of these barriers.
Specifically, it functions by “prohibiting banks from engaging in proprietary trading, eliminating portfolio
hedging, and preventing banks from having an ownership interest in covered funds,”44 although it does
allow banks exemptions for certain underwriting, and market making, and risk-mitigating hedging
activities.45 These prohibitions are supposed to lessen the risks that commercial banks are exposed to,
thereby making them less likely to fail.
III.

Critiques and Alternatives to Dodd-Frank

However, a number of scholars have criticized Dodd-Frank as being “inadequate”46 to address too
big to fail. One of the criticisms voiced by many is the continued existence of the implied subsidy to
TBTF institutions.47 Indeed, one study by the International Monetary Fund estimates that the subsidy to
39
Steven J. Markovich, The Dodd-Frank Act (2013), available at http://www.cfr.org/united-states/dodd-frankact/p28735.
40
The Dodd-Frank Act and Too-Big-to-Fail: Literature Survey.
41
Banking Act of 1933 §§ 16, 20, 21, and 32, Pub.L. 73–66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933).
42
See Simon Kwan, Cracking the Glass-Steagall Barriers, FRBSF ECONOMIC LETTER (March 21, 1997), available at
http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economic-letter/1997/march/cracking-the-glass-steagallbarriers/.
43
Pub.L. 106–102, 113 Stat. 1338, enacted November 12, 1999.
44
Joshua Bohl, Analyzing the Volcker Rule’s Impact on Commercial Banks (2014), at 1, on file with author.
45
See Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships With, Hedge
Funds and Private Equity Funds: Final Rule, 79 FR 5536 (2014).
46
Wilmarth, supra note 22.
47
See Steven A. Ramirez, Dodd-Frank as Maginot Line, 15 CHAP. L. REV. 109, 110 (2011) (noting that Dodd-Frank
“may render such a crisis [as 2008] more likely by transforming implicit guarantees for megabanks into explicit
guarantees”); Dean Baker & Travis McArthur, The Value of the "Too Big to Fail" Big Bank Subsidy, Ctr. for Econ. &
Policy Research (Sept. 2009), available at http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/too-big-to-fail-200909.pdf); Charles W. Murdock, The Dodd- Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: What Caused the
Financial Crisis and Will Dodd-Frank Prevent Future Crises?, 64 SMU L. REV. 1243 (2011); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
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TBTF institutions has “increased” after the crisis.48 Also, Arthur Wilmarth notes that ratings agencies
upgraded the ratings “for deposits and senior debt issued by the six largest U.S. banks, based on [the
agencies’] expectation of ‘a very high probability of systemic support’ for such banks from the U.S.
government.”49
Another criticism is that Dodd-Frank over-relies on prudential standards.50 Wilmarth again notes
that Dodd-Frank’s principal direct instrument of higher capital requirements is troublesome because
“capital-based regulation has repeatedly failed in the past [due to] … ‘regulatory capital arbitrage.’”51
This is a concern that was raised previously by this author in Why we Need a Superfund for Hedge Funds.
That article noted that higher “reserve and margin requirements, … [while helpful, would not on their
own] directly address liquidity risk,”52 again partly because the “rapidly changing strategies”53 of the
financial sector would enable regulatory capital arbitrage.
Consequently, financial law and policy scholars have proposed a number of alternatives to better
address too big to fail. A number of these alternatives are designed to change the internal decisionmaking of SIFIs, while others are proposed to directly reduce the need for any government bailout.
Some have proposed changes to corporate governance, including “greater representation of public
interests at the board and executive levels of big banks,”54 and the adoption of "behavioral economicsbased guidelines regarding risk committees’ composition, obligation requirements, and working
procedure.”55 Another has proposed creating “a bailout exception to their bank's limited-shareholderliability status, thus requiring shareholders - not taxpayers - to cover the ultimate costs of the bank's
failure.”56
Another way to alter decision-making by SIFIs is to give them financial incentives. One such financial
incentive is by taxing risky behavior by the SIFI. These taxes are imposed to correct “overly risky

Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need for Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111
COLUM. L. REV. 795, 800 (2011); and Wilmarth, supra note 22, at 983 (finding that “Dodd-Frank’s provisions fall far
short of the changes that would be needed ... to remove other public subsidies for TBTF institutions”).
48
Kenichi Ueda and Beatrice Weder di Mauro, Quantifying Structural Subsidy Values for Systemically Important
Financial Institutions (2012), at 1, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12128.pdf.
49
Wilmarth, supra note 22, at 983-4 (quoting FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT,
GOVERNMENTAL RESCUES OF “TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL” FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 12 (2010)).
50
See Wilmarth, supra note 22, at 1009-10 (noting that "Dodd-Frank relies heavily on the concept of stronger
capital requirements, [and] … capital-based regulation has repeatedly failed in the past;” and that SIFIs “have
repeatedly demonstrated their ability to engage in ‘regulatory capital arbitrage’ in order to weaken the
effectiveness of capital requirements").
51
Superfund for Hedge Funds, at 1009-10.
52
Id. at 1023.
53
Id. at 1024.
54
Lawrence G. Baxter, Betting Big: Value, Caution and Accountability in an Era of Large Banks and Complex
Finance, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 765, 765.
55
Nizan Geslevich Packin, It's (Not) All About the Money: Using Behavioral Economics to Improve Regulation of
Risk Management in Financial Institutions, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 419, 481 (2013).
56
Peter Conti-Brown, Elective Shareholder Liability, 64 STAN. L. REV. 409, 409 (2012)
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behavior by financial institutions [that] can generate negative externalities,57 because the costs of their
possible failure may spread to others.”58 A Pigouvian tax59 on their risky behavior will force SIFIs to
internalize these externalities. Such a tax on systemic risks has been proposed by Iman Anabtawi and
Steven Schwarcz,60 while others have suggested implementing a systemic risk tax and then using tax
revenues from it to help fund the Orderly Liquidation Fund.61 This approach is the same one offered
previously by this author in Why we Need a Superfund for Hedge Funds.
Meanwhile, other proposals deal with too big to fail more directly. A number of scholars including
former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan,62 Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz,63 and Simon
Johnson and James Kwak64 have all suggested that what we need to do is break up the large financial
institutions, so that none would now be too-big-to-fail. Another recommendation would be the more
widespread use of “contingent capital,”65 which is “a debt instrument that becomes instead an equity
instrument when certain contingencies – such as a financial crisis – occur.” 66
Thus, a number of different alternatives have been proposed to address the insufficiencies of DoddFrank’s approaches to ending TBTF. Corporate governance changes should be conducted, but their
power to address liquidity and systemic risks may depend on shareholder’s continuing limited ability to
properly their agents who operate SIFIs. Breaking up the largest SIFIs could bring many benefits, but this

57

A negative externality occurs when a firm’s behavior generates a cost that is not imposed on itself but is instead
imposed on others.
58
The Dodd-Frank Act and Too-Big-to-Fail: Literature Survey.
59
See ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920).
60
Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 33, at 1402.
61
See Int'l Monetary Fund, A Fair and Substantial Contribution by the Financial Sector: Final Report for the G-20
(2010), at 5, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/062710b.pdf. (arguing for a “Financial Stability
Contribution” whose “main component … would be a levy to pay for the fiscal cost of any future government
support to the sector”); Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank’s Dangers
and the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 151, 151(2011) (“propos[ing] the
creation of a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund ... [which] should be funded ... by risk-adjusted assessments on
all large financial firms”); and Wilmarth, supra note 22, at 1020 (arguing for the use of “risk-based insurance
premiums” on SIFIs to fund the OLF). For a related recommendation, see Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as
Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 474 (2011) (calling for a
“mandatory system of mutual self-insurance”).
62
See Michael McKee and Scott Lanman, Greenspan Says U.S. Should Consider Breaking Up Large Banks (October
15, 2009), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=email_en&sid=aJ8HPmNUfchg (quoting
Greenspan saying, “‘If they’re too big to fail, they’re too big’”).
63
See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE WORLD ECONOMY,
164–65 (2010) (suggesting that “there is an obvious solution to the too big to fail banks: break them up”).
64
See SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL
MELTDOWN, 214-15 (2010) (proposing a cap of four percent of Gross Domestic Product for banks and two percent
for securities firms).
65
See Coffee, supra note 47, at 806 (arguing that “contingent capital ... not only can [] prevent the fall of the first
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policy may also limit the achievement of significant economies of scale. It is also not clear that size
would be the only factor that could lead to a government bailout, and if so, the two market distortions
would remain. There also can be many benefits from the more widespread adoption of contingent
capital, though this author remains unconvinced that its use will fully eliminate liquidity and systemic
risks. Nonetheless, its use could clearly reduce the impact of any individual SIFI failure, and so it could
be an important component of a more complete package to address too-big-to-fail.
What else should be part of this package? Just as in Why we Need a Superfund for Hedge Funds, this
author sees significant benefits from the approach that combines Pigouvian taxes with a “Superfund to
Fund Purchases of Illiquid Securities.”67 The next section will explain why the liquidity tax
recommendation needs to be extended to incorporate two distinct taxes.
In the end, TBTF is a self-perpetuating cycle, for which we can at best hope to minimize its
amplitude. In order to do this, in the next section, we will examine more closely these factors
underlying TBTF.
TBTF causes two significant market distortions, one with respect to the creditors of TBTF banks68
and the other with respect to portfolio choices made by the TBTF banks themselves. Additionally,
We will now more closely examine the market distortions caused by TBTF. When a creditor makes a
loan to a non-TBTF bank, prudency requires that the creditor investigate the riskiness of the bank,
because federal insurance limitations mean that failure of the bank could result in nonpayment of the
loan. On the other hand, with a TBTF bank, the creditor may believe that this bank’s status as TBTF
means that, even if the bank runs into trouble, the creditor will still have their loan principal returned.
As a result, creditors will not need to charge an additional risk premium to the TBTF bank for its loan.
These differences can be illustrated by the following two equations:
(Interest Rate)REGULAR BANK i = (Interest Rate)RISK-FREE RETURN + (Risk Premium)REGULAR BANK i

(1)

(Interest Rate)TBTF BANK j = (Interest Rate)RISK-FREE RETURN + (Risk Premium)TBTF BANK j – (Implied TBTF Subsidy)j (2)
What these two equations demonstrate is that the TBTF bank will be able to raise its capital while
paying a lower interest rate than regular banks. This creates a competitive advantage for TBTF banks,
which also means that they can expand further, thereby further entrenching their status as too-big-tofail.
Another inefficiency arises in a TBTF bank’s use of capital. It is a classic “moral hazard” situation
where the incentives set up by a TBTF policy lead the bank’s managers to select overly risky investments
to add to the bank’s portfolio. The “moral hazard” problem is this: a TBTF bank manager will consider a
wide range of possible investments for the bank. In constructing a portfolio, managers normally will try
to balance risk and return. While riskier investments can bring a larger return, they also can lead to
67
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losses. However, for a TBTF bank, investments with significant losses do not necessarily result in an
overall loss to the bank, because governmental regulators may step in “bail out” the TBTF bank.
Consequently, to the TBTF bank manager, extremely risky investments may bring with them significant
profits if things turn out well, while if things turn poorly, the TBTF quasi-guarantee will place a limit on
the total amount of losses imposed on the bank. This means that TBTF bank managers will have a strong
incentive to select more risky investments than optimal. This effect makes it more likely that a TBTF
bank will need a bail out if one or more of its “protected” investments fail.
These concerns came to fruition in the Financial Crisis of 2008.
Thus, the 2008 Financial Crisis gave us examples of both the moral hazard distortion and the costof-capital-subsidy distortion.

IV.

What is Needed? Two Separate Taxes on SIFIs

We have seen that, even after Dodd-Frank, we still have two market distortions caused by a de facto
too-big-to-fail policy. To many, these market distortions seem connected, and so it might seem as
though we could use a single tax to address both. On the other hand, as this author has stated
previously, “In general, it is better to use at least as many instruments as the number of goals to be
achieved.”69 In this case, when we look at how the taxes would be calculated, we will see that they will
be based on quite different sets of information, and so one tax alone will not address both market
distortions.
In general, having too few instruments means that at least one goal will not be properly addressed.
If we have only a tax to counteract the TBTF subsidy in raising capital, then individual managers at the
TBTF bank will still face the moral hazard of having strong incentives to choose more risky investments,
possibly leading to another financial crisis. Meanwhile, if we only have a tax on liquidity and systemic
risks,70 creditors will still be willing to lend capital to TBTF banks at a discounted interest rate. As noted
above, this distortion can lead to greater industry concentration, which again can possibly lead to
another financial crisis.
One might suggest that a single tax might be sufficient in this particular case, because both taxes
would be related to the risks posed by the TBTF banks. For example, Wilmarth points to the problem of
the continuing subsidy for TBTF firms and proposes that “Congress should amend Dodd-Frank to require
SIFIs to pay risk-based insurance premiums to prefund the OLF [Orderly Liquidation Fund].”71 One
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reason offered by Wilmarth for doing this is because “the payment of risk-based assessments to prefund the OLF would reduce TBTF subsidies for SIFIs by forcing them to internalize more of the “negative
externality” (i.e., the potential public bailout cost) of their activities. To accomplish the goal of
internalizing risk, the marginal rates for OLF assessments should become progressively higher for SIFIs
that create a greater potential for systemic risk. ... A pre-funded OLF with appropriately calibrated riskbased assessments would reduce moral hazard among SIFIs.”72 Thus, Wilmarth seems to state that a
single risk-based assessment will reduce both “TBTF subsidies” and “moral hazard.”
Similarly, John Coffee’s comments directly connect the two market distortions. He writes:
Many economists believe that the market's perception that some financial institutions were
"too big to fail" (and would therefore be bailed out with public funds) resulted in an unintended
subsidy for these institutions because their creditors charged them less for capital than their
true risk level justified. As a result, because capital was cheap to them, these firms (and their
shareholders) were incentivized to take on excessive leverage.73
Here, Coffee directly connects one distortion with the other: he too makes the connection that the
TBTF subsidy to their capital costs would “incentivize” TBTF banks into the moral hazard of excessive
leverage. As such, it would seem that a tax that would address one would also address the other.
However, as we look at how the two taxes should be assessed, we will better understand that they are
not the same, and should be implemented separately.
Let’s first consider the tax to correct the creditor subsidy to TBTF banks (hereinafter the “Creditor
Subsidy Tax” or CST). The problem to be addressed is to counteract the discounted interest rates that
creditors are offering TBTF banks. Creditors’ assessments of these banks are based on publicly available
information about them, and so that is the information that should be used in assessing the Creditor
Subsidy Tax. To calculate this tax, recall equations (1) and (2) above, showing the interest rate
demanded by creditors before they are willing to loan to a particular bank. We can use these equations
to specify a regression equation that would enable us to calculate the Creditor Subsidy Tax:
IRk = β0 + β1*Xk – TBTFk (β2 + β3*Sizek) + ε

(3)

In this equation, IRk is the interest rate demanded of bank k, Xk is a vector of publicly available variables
used to assess the ex ante riskiness of bank k (β1*Xk itself represents the Risk Premium associated with
bank k), and TBTF is a dummy variable that is equal to one if bank k is too-big-to-fail (and is otherwise
equal to zero). After estimating this equation, focusing on the effects of the ex ante publicly available
variables, the ideal tax on TBTF bank k’s capital acquisition that would completely counter the implied
TBTF creditor subsidy would be equal to (β2 + β3*Sizek). It should be noted that this tax would be
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essentially equivalent to Wilmarth’s proposal to collect risk-based insurance premia from SIFIs for
prefunding the OLF.
In contrast, the tax to address the moral hazard problem leading to excessive liquidity and systemic
risks (hereinafter the “Moral Hazard Tax” or MHT) will be designed to force banks to internalize the
externality costs of the liquidity and systemic risks embedded in the portfolio choices made by the
banks. As described in Why we Need a Superfund for Hedge Funds, hedge funds, banks, and other
financial entities will be reluctant to share the specific portfolio information needed to properly assess
its level of liquidity and systemic risk.74 To get around this, a private review of the portfolio must be
done with a lag.75 This lagged review examines private information about the specific composition of
the portfolio, and is conducted ex post. By analyzing the portfolio itself, along with all other systemically
important portfolios, the regulator can properly assess its liquidity and systemic risks.76 The Moral
Hazard Tax can then be properly calibrated to adjust to the level of these risks.
In order for this ex post analysis to create proper incentives, it needs to be combined with the use of
rulemaking procedures, which can be conducted by the FSOC. As stated in the “Superfund for Hedge
Funds” article, "incorporat[ing] public rulemaking procedures ... to assess the liquidity risks of
[portfolios] would also then improve the transparency of the tax, so that [the regulated entities] would
better predict the level of the ... tax for a given [portfolio]."77 This process would provide a direct
incentive for TBTF banks to form risk committees, as suggested by Packin, as they learn to better
manage both the risks and taxes associated with different portfolio choices. Thus, the implementation
of the Moral Hazard Tax will involve not just the private assessment of the tax itself, but also the use of
public rulemaking procedures along with the participation of bank risk committees.
Thus, we see that the Creditor Subsidy Tax and the Moral Hazard Tax are constructed in different
ways. One is a tax on capital raised by the TBTF bank, and the other is a tax on the liquidity and systemic
risks contained in the bank’s portfolio. Designed to counteract the effects of different decision makers
(creditors in one case and the bank’s managers in another), they must rely on different sets of
information. Calculation of the CST is based on publicly available information about the entire bank
itself, while the MHT is based on a private examination of the specific components of the bank’s
portfolio. Because they are designed for different purposes and are based on different sets of
information, one tax cannot easily substitute for the other, and so both taxes must be used.
There are some disadvantages to this approach. Calibration of the MHT may be difficult: how do
you assess the level correctly to properly deter overly risky decisions? However, behavioral economics
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suggests that precise fine-tuning may not be necessary to address our objective. By simply making an
analysis of liquidity and systemic risks part of the decision process, and embedding it inside the banks
through risk committees, we may achieve our ultimate objective of reducing these risks.
The foremost obstacle will be political. One of these taxes (the CST) was essentially initially part of
the original Dodd-Frank legislation, but was forced to be removed. As Wilmarth notes, “early versions of
the [Dodd-Frank] legislation ... would have authorized the FDIC to pre-fund the OLF by collecting up to
$150 billion in risk-based assessments from nonbank SIFIs and large BHCs. … However, Senate
Republicans repeatedly blocked consideration of the bill on the Senate floor until Senate Democrats
agreed to remove the pre-funding provision.”78 More recently, implementation of other parts of DoddFrank has been delayed significantly by financial industry opposition and lobbying.79 In December 2013,
after regulatory agencies finally agreed on a final version of the “Volcker Rule,” industry groups have
again been objecting to its implementation and have filed lawsuits opposing it.80
Despite these obstacles, there are many advantages to the use of both the Creditor Subsidy Tax and
the Moral Hazard Tax. As opposed to a command-and-control regulatory approach, these two taxes can
be flexible and quickly adapt to changes in the financial industry: “because they are not tied to any
particular strategies or financial securities, the tax [system can] … adapt to [financial] innovations in
order to provide incentives to reduce the externalities of liquidity risks.”81 By using an ex post approach
to the MHT, financial firms will know that innovations in financial products cannot be designed in order
to “exploit a loophole,” such as could be done with fixed command-and-control regulations. The
innovative financial product will be evaluated simply on the level of liquidity and systemic risks it entails.
More importantly, because this is a market-based approach, financial firms will have more flexibility
in designing new financial product innovations. They also will have more freedom to pursue and utilize
firm and market structures whose advantages are based on social efficiencies rather than the market
distortions of too-big-to-fail. These advantages might even propel the financial industry to support the
implementation of both the Creditor Subsidy Tax and the Moral Hazard Tax. Only then would we be
finally able to address properly the inefficiencies caused by too-big-to-fail.
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